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FOREWORD 
*This document constitutes Volume 1 of a seven volume final 
report prepared by Teledyne Brown Engineering, Huntsville, Alabama 
under NASA Contract'NAS10-8676,?taunch Site -Processing of Hazardous 
Payloads. This study required a thorough analysis of the impact on the 
launch site and its operations by hazardous Space Shuttle Payloads) 
The-seven volumes of the final report are~a-s-ifoows: 
Volume 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. r'his volume presents 
a concise review of the results of the study and summarizes the 
principal conclusions and recommendations. 
Volume Z. HAZARDOUS PAYLOADS SURVEY AND 
ANALYSIS: This volume presents the results of a survey and an analysis 
of proposed Shuttle payloads to identify hazardous payloads and to define 
the characteristics of materials and systems that make them hazardous. 
This task included the development of hazardous payloads ranking tech­
nique and recommendations for processing analysis on selected payloads. 
Volume 3. NORMAL PROCESSING ANALYSIS: This 
volume presents preliminary normal processing flow plans for three 
Shuttle cargoes selected as a result of the Hazardous Payloads Survey 
and 	Analysis Task: 
* 	 Spacelab with Advanced Technology Laboratory 
* 	 Tug, Solar Electric Propulsion Stage, and Synchronous 
Earth Observatory Satellite 
* 	 Interim Upper Stage, and a Pioneer Jupiter Probe with 
a Fluorine Propulsion Unit 
The preliminary processing flow plans include identification 
of unique facilities and GSE, processing hazards, and payload safety 
related design criteria. 
Volume 4. CONTINGENCY PROCESSING ANALYSIS: This 
volume presents preliminary alternate processing flow plans for con­
tingency situations for the three Shuttle cargoes analyzed in the Normal 
Processing Analysis Task. 
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Volume 5. CURRENT PAYLOADS SURVEY AND ANALYSIS: 
This volume presents the results of a survey and an analysis to determine 
payloads that are currently flying and that may also fly on the Shuttle 
vehicle when it becomes operational. The analysis determines hazardous 
materials/systems for each of these current payloads and recommends 
design and operational safety criteria for each hazardous current pay­
load to minimize its impact on the Shuttle Transportation System. 
Volume 6. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
POTENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: This volume presents the results of an 
evaluation of the probable environmental impaqt of Shuttle payloads 
hazardous materials and includes recommended KSC Environmental 
Impact Statement Potential Requirements. 
Volume 7. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS: 
This volume presents a list of special problems identified in the study
that require advanced technology study or technology development. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Payloads containing hazardous mhaterials associated with spade 
vehicle launch operations have been recognized and dealt with on previous 
R&D space programs. However, when compared to the Shuttle Program, 
these R&D space programs involved relatively few launches with consider­
able time between launches. The Shuttle operational program will have 
a high launch rate and in many cases individual launches will have several 
independent payloads for accomplishment of separate missions. Some 
of these payloads by intent will be recoverable for purpose of reuse, and 
all must be recoverable in the sense that possible abort situations prior 
to deployment have to be recognized. 
Present processing schedules have been derived assuming 
nominal passive payloads and nominal payload flow time. A number of 
specifically safety oriented studies on Shuttle payloads have been per­
formed in recent years. However, relatively few of these have treated 
ground operations in depth, and the overall impact of Shuttle payload 
hazards on launch and landing site processing and procedures has not 
been documented. In order to fill this gap, this 10 month study was 
initiated in July 1974. 
The purpose of this report is to present an overview of the 
entire study and summarize the major results. In section 2. 0, a summary 
of the principal study conclusions are listed. In section 3. 0 the study 
results are presented on a task by task basis. Section 4. 0 presents the 
highlights of the study results on a cargo related basis. Finally, 
recommendations for further study and advanced technology developments 
are presented in sections 5. 0 ahd 6. 0. 
1. 1 STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The overall objectives 6f this study were to identify hazardous 
systems and materials in Shuttle payloads and to develop safety oriented 
normal and coiitingency launch site processing plans for selected pay­
loads. the impact on the existing KSC Environmental Impact Statement 
by Shuttle hazardous payloads was determined as well as the need for 
further studies and advanced technology development. 
1.2 SCOPE 
This study has inirolved a thorough analysis of the potential 
impact of hazardous Space Shuttle payloads on the launch site and pro­
i 
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cessing operations. This has included an analysis of the hazards 
associated with launch site operations from receipt of the payload through 
launch, landing, and refurbishment. The study consisted of the following 
tasks: 
* Task 1: 	 Hazardous Payloads Survey and Analysis 
* Task 2: 	 Normal Processing Analysis 
* Task 3: 	 Contingency Processing Analypis 
a Task 4: 	 Current Payloads Survey and Analysis 
* 	 Task 5: Environmental Impact Statement Potential 
Requirements Study 
* Task 6: 	 Advanced Technology Requirements 
Requirements for special Ground Support Equipment (GSE) 
items and facilities, safety and operational requirements, and areas of 
payload design that can favorably affect safe and efficient launch site 
processing operations were identified as part of these tasks. 
STUDY APPROACH 
The six basic tasks in this study and their interrelationships 
are depicted in Figure 1. Task 1 involved surveying and analyzing all 
Shuttle payloads to determine those materials and systems that are 
hazardous. This task entailed extensive contact with the scientific 
community and a thorough search of existing documentation. 
The payloads 	identified as hazardous -were then grouped into 
feasible cargoes. From this group, three cargoes were selected and 
approved by KSC for processing analysis based on processing coverage, 
hazardous materials coverage, unique hazards, and payload hazard 
potential. 
Next, normal processing analysis (Task 2) was conducted on 
each of the three cargoes selected. This analysis included a detailed 
breakdown of each operation sufficient to identify all hazards, GSE and 
facility requirements, and to establish time lines. 
z
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FIGURE 1. TASK RELATIONSHIP 
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Each of the hazardous conditions uncovered in Task 2 became 
a candidate for the development of a contingency plan for Task 3. A 
group of such contingencies was developed into work-around processing 
plans that would help minimize the impact of accidents or unplanned 
events in the Shuttle processing. Sixteen contingency plans were developed 
for the three cargoes. 
Task 4 involved analyzing payloads that are currently flying 
and may also fly on the Shuttle to determine their hazardous systems 
and materials. Operational and design safety criteria and requirements 
were developed for the hazardous systems on these payloads, Twenty 
one current payloads were identified and the appropriate criteria and 
requirements were specified for each payload. 
Those hazards that were not addressed by the current KSC 
Environmental Impact Statement were identified in Task 5 and evaluated 
for their potential effects on the environment. Methods for providing 
environmental protection were recommended. 
Task 6 identified advanced technology requirements. 
1.4 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER NASA EFFORT 
This study, which was dedicated to safety implications concerning 
ground operations of hazardous Space Shuttle payloads and cargoes, relates 
essentially to any future ground operations efforts for Shuttle payloads, 
Spacelab, Interim Upper Stage (IUS), and Space Tug. KSC inhouse efforts 
will profit by its results as will contracted efforts, such as ongoing and 
impending studies like: 
* Launch Site Integrated Operations 
* Launch Site Payload Accommodation Handbook 
* Multiuse Mission Support Equipment 
* Payload Ground Operations Requirements 
* Post Landing Payload Support 
The study will also be beneficial to the validation efforts by the 
U. S. Air Force for the Interim Upper Stage (IUS), which are planned to 
start early next year. 
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2.0 SUMMARY OF STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
* 	 This study has shown that the processing of fluorinated 
oxidizers is the most difficult from a safety viewpoint 
and will have a significant impact on ground processing 
operations. A dedicated loading facility and GSE for 
control and monitoring are required. Of special concern 
is the consequence of the release of highly reactive F 2 
in the presence of fuels and organic materials. Special 
procedures and trained personnel are required. 
* 	 Mercury containing payloads can be processed safely 
without significant impact on processing operations. 
Of primary concern in processing mercury containing 
payloads is contamination and environmental pollution 
which can be controlled. Mercury leakage in the pay­
load bay could result in a mission scrub because the 
orbiter and payload would require refurbishment. 
* 	 Microorganisms and biological hazards present unique 
operational problems relating to on board loading time 
but the hazardous aspects can be controlled with facilities 
such as a mobile biological laboratory and packaging. 
* 	 RTG's present special problems with cooling and radiation 
and require special GSE and handling and will restrict 
operations. Loading of RTG's at the latest available 
time in the countdown is the safest method and presents 
the least impact. 
* 	 Simultaneous leakages of hazardous fluids present potential 
catastrophic situations. Payload bay inerting purges, 
hazardous gas analyzers for detection, and pressurization 
in flight are required safety concerns. 
* 	 Vertical payload mating and vertical installation at the pad 
are recommended for hazardous cargoes (exception of 
Spacelab and passive payloads). 
* 	 Payload access in the cargo bay is a problem area and 
may impose severe design constraints on payloads. 
* 	 A change in the cargo checkout philosophy sequence on 
some payloads is required because of the relatively small 
amount of time allocated for the Orbiter at the pad. 
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3.0 SUMMARY OF TASK RESULTS
 
3. 1 HAZARDOUS PAYLOADS SURVEY AND ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this task was to select representative hazardous
 
cargoes for detailed processing analysis.
 
3. 1. 1 Payload Survey 
A comprehensive documentation search and review were con­
ducted and communications with NASA and the scientific community 
were used in the survey and identification of the various Shuttle payloads 
for hazardous materials/systems. This survey identified Z19 potential 
payloads that may fly on the Shuttle and assessed the hazard potential of 
each payload. (The hazard potential is a function of the likelihood of 
occurrence of an undesired event and of the impact of such an occurrence.) 
Weighting factors were developed to estimate impacts of undesired 
events for all hazards. Approximately 50 different systems/materials 
were found to be hazardous. Table I shows the categories, hazardous 
materials/systems in each category, and a summary of the characteristics 
that make them hazardous. 
TABLE I. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS/SYSTEMS SUMMARY 
Category 	 Hazardous Characteristics Hazardous Mate rials/Systems 
Cryogenics Asphyxiants, explosive, flammable, LH2 , LO., LHe, LHeII, LNe, 
contamination sensitive, toxic, LN2 and LF2 
personnel injury/equipment damage 
from extreme cold. 
Hypergolics 	 Flammable, corrosive, toxic, Hydrazine and its methyl 
contamination sensitive, explosive, 	 derivatives, nitrogen tetroxide, 
fluorine, and Inhibited Red 
Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA). 
Toxic/Asphyxiant May act as asphyxiants by displacing Ammonia; gaseous argon, helium, 
air and/or vapor may be toxic, neon, krypton, xenon, nitrogen; 
Freon 113 and related chlorofluoro 
compounds; mercury; silicate 
esters (cooling fluid). 
Radiological Burns, injury, equipment damage, RTG's, RHU's, laser, UV, 
high temperature. microwave, RF, barium, 
americium, X-ray, ion source. 
High Temperature 	 Burns, ignition source. Heaters, RTG's, RHU's 
High Pressure 	 Injury, damage, explosive. 
Electrical 	 Shock, sparking, overheating, burns,
 
ignition source.
 
Microbiological Pathogenic hazards. 	 Microorganisms, bacteria, 
viruses. 
Fire/Explosives Flammable, explosive, sensitive to Solid propellants; pyrotechnics, 
RF, spontaneous ignition in air. batteries, methane and homologous 
hydrocarbons; and flammable metalsPreceding page blankhsuch 	 as rubidium, cesium, and 
lithium hydride. 
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3. 1. 	Z Candidate Cargo Selection 
Candidate cargoes were developed using the 727 cargoes given 
in the Shuttle traffic model as well as those scheduled for the first 20 
missions. In addition to these, tentative cargoes comprised of other 
payload groupings that could be flown were developed and tested for 
compatibility (orbital requirements, size, weight, etc. ) to select 
feasible candidate cargoes. A cargo selection rationale consisting of 
hazard potential, hazardous materials and quantities, systems coverage, 
unique materials and processes, and number of flights was devised as a 
second series of tests to obtain a manageable number of cargoes. 
Fourteen candidate cargoes resulted from this activity. 
3. 1. 3 Final Cargo Selection 
The final step was to select cargoes to be analyzed in the normal 
and contingency processing analysis tasks. Rationale for final selection 
included high hazard potential, high number of flights, broad coverage 
of hazardous materials, and a payloads processing scenario to ensure 
that all major launch site processing paths would be covered. 
3. 1.4 Results 
Three Shuttle cargoes consisting of nine payloads were selected 
and approved by KSC for processing analysis in this study. 
* 	 A-Spacelab with an Advanced Technology Laboratory (ATL) 
and an Integrated Real Time Contamination Monitor (IRTCM). 
* 	 A cryogenically fueled Tug carrying a Solar Electric Pro­
pulsion Stage (SEPS) and a Synchronous Earth Observatory 
Satellite (SEOS). 
* 	 A conceptual Interim Upper Stage (IUS) carrying a Pioneer 
Jupiter Probe (PJP) with a Fluorine Propulsion Unit (FZPU). 
3. Z NORMAL PROCESSING 
The purpose of this task was to develop and analyze normal 
launch site processing flows for each of the three cargoes selected. 
These normal processing flows were developed to the level necessary 
to identify all processing hazards, waterfall/time lines, unique facility 
and GSE requirements, safety requirements for launch site protection, 
and 	payload safety related design criteria. 
8 
10TELEDYNE 
BROWN ENGINEERING 
3. 2. 1 Results Summary 
3. 2. 1. 1 Cargo Hazards 
The three cargoes normal base line processing flows and 
functional event descriptions resulted in the identification of Z8 different 
types of hazards distributed throughout Z37 operational events. An 
analysis of each event, of the operations involved, and of the hazardous 
systems was performed to determine the effect of the hazard on per­
sonnel, facilities, payloads, Orbiter, and the environment. To reduce 
or eliminate the effects of the payload hazards, 87 payload design 
recommendations'were made, IZ5 safety related operational require­
ments were identified, and 57 items/requirements for support equip­
ment were generated. The hazards that were identified for each of the 
three cargoes, the frequency of occurrence, and the final hazard 
categorization are shown in Table IT. 
TABLE II. CARGO HAZARDS SUMMARY 
Frequency of Occurrence Final Hazard 
Hazard Types Spacelab Tug [US Cateaoriation 
High Pressure 7 18 15 Catastrophic 
Cryogenic F 2 Overpressure 5 1 Catastrophic and 
4 Critical 
Hydrazne 8&Methyl Dernivatives 6 5 Critical 
Mercury 2 Critical 
APS Thruster Firing - Toxic Gas 2 2 Critical 
Cryogenic O2 3 Critical 
Cryogenic 4 CriticalHZ 

cF I Critical 
Cryogenic F 2 2 Critical 
N0 4 Z 1 Critical and 
1 Controlled 
GN 2 Purge 1 15 6 Controlled 
Electrical Power 6 26 13 Controlled 
RF Emissions 4 3 Controlled 
Laser Z 1 Controlled 
High Temperature 1 1 Controlled 
Moving Equipment 1 Controlled 
Freon 3 Controlled 
Pyrotechnics - Safed 5 2 Controlled 
Pyrotechnics - Armed 2 2 1 Controlled 
Batteries 4 1 Controlled 
Hydraulics I Controlled 
Pnrge with Hot GN 2 I Controlled 
Radar 2 Controlled 
Steam Generator 2 Controlled 
Microbiological 3 Controlled 
Cryogenic N2 5 Controlled 
Radiological 2 Controlled 
Krypton 85 Z Controlled 
3. Z. 1. Z Interface Hazards 
Those operational events containing more than one hazard and 
those operations where hazards were continued from previous events 
were examined for possible interface hazards. 
9 
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In the Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM cargo, two events were found to 
present an interface hazard potential and both of these involved electrical 
power application checks that could lead to the inadvertent activation 
of other hazardous sources such as laser, radar, or steam generator. 
The major interface hazards for the IUS/FZPU/PJP cargo are 
centered around fluorine and other hypergolic materials such as hydrazine 
and NZ0 4 . The potentially catastrophic effect of a water leak from the 
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) cooling jackets combining 
with a fluorine leak is also an interaction hazard. Fluorine leakages 
could adversely affect critical electronics, and control circuits. 
In the Tug/SEPS/SEOS cargo, the 10 events found to present 
an interface hazard potential had as their common causative or accessory 
hazard the application or use of electrical power. Electrical power 
application usually involves checks, tests and/or verifications of various 
communications networks, control systems and interfaces. The elec­
trical power application can lead to the inadvertent activation of other 
hazardous sources, such as RF generating systems, lasers, heaters or 
thruster gimbals. Mercury leakage could also cause electrical shorts, 
arcing, and affect critical circuits. 
In all cargoes, the application of electrical power or mal­
function in an electrical system could lead to the ignition of spilled or 
leaking fuels. Similarly, inadvertent power application to pyrotechnic 
devices could result in the ignition of other fuel sources. Finally, the 
presence of propellant reactants (LO Z , LHZ , LF Z , NZ0 4 , and NzH4 ) 
presents a potentially catastrophic situation if simultaneous leakages 
should occur. 
3. 2. 1. 3 Time Line Analysis 
The time line analysis conducted revealed that no Orbiter con­
straints are imposed. For safety reasons, it was necessary to perform
off-line loading of fluorine in the FZPU. This operation involves passi­
vation, loading, stabilizing, and monitoring, which is a 31 hour opera­
tion. Obviously, without off-line fluorine loading the Orbiter processing 
would have been impacted. 
3. 2. 1.4 GSE/Facility Identification for Normal Processing 
Fifty seven items of GSE/facility were identified for the normal 
processing of all three cargoes. The items that may cause a significant 
impact on KSC are as follows: 
10 
ItTELEDYNE 
BROWN ENGINEERING 
* 	 GSE 
-- IUS/F 2 PU Cargo Transporter (LN2 Dewar and Monitoring 
System) 
-- Portable Fluorine Disposal Unit and LN2 Dewar for use 
at: 
- Fluorine Loading Facility 
- SAEF #1 
- Launch Pad 
-- Personal Life Support Equipment Compatible with 
Fluorine
 
-- Fluorine Sensing Systems
 
-- Mercury Servicing Unit
 
-- Mercury Sensing Systems
 
* 	 Facilities 
-- Dedicated Fluorine Facility 
-- Hydrazine APS Dedicated Loading Area in SAEF #1 
- - Mobile Biological Holding Facility 
-- Laser Test Facility 
3.3 CONTINGENCY PROCESSING ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this analysis was to provide a method of returning 
operations to normal or near normal with a minimum loss of time, mini­
mum damage to facilities, and minimum exposure of personnel to 
hazards after an accident or unscheduled event occurred. In this study, 
16 contingency plans were developed for the three cargoes. Table IV 
lists the contingency plans developed for each cargo. 
TABLE IV. CONTINGENCY PLANS 
SPACELABIATL TUGISEPSISEOS IUS/F2PU/PJP 
a MISSION ABORT X X X 
s VERTICAL CHANGEOUT AT THE PAD X X X 
@ 	 BACKOUT OPERATIONS X X X 
a 	 CRASHISHOCK CONDITION X X
 
LANDING AT KSC
 
* 	 CRASHISHOCK CONDITION X X
 
LANDING AT CONTINGENCY SITE
 
* 	 NORMAL LANDING AT X X
 
CONTINGENCY SITE
 
s 	 ACCIDENT (LOSS OF RTG COOLING) X 
11 
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3. 3. 1 Results Summary 
A summary of the significant requirements for proceeding 
through the alternate processing situations is shown in Table V. Cargo/ 
payload safing requirements, Orbiter/payload interface requirements, 
payload design requirements, and special GSE requirements are included. 
The requirements/conclusions/recommendations listed in the table are 
related to the applicable contingency plan and cargo. 
TABLE V. CONTINGENCY PLAN REQUIREMENTS 
CONTINOENCY PLANREQUIREMEN] S/CONoLuSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
BACKOUT,VERT- 'CISSION LAND AT CRASH/SHOCK CtASH/SHOCK 
ICAL CIIANGEOUT ABORT -ALT. SITE LAND AT KSC LAND AT ALT SiTE 
I 	 Sh.ottl/Orthiter Satint and Open Pad. A. II, C 
2 	 Pat load Hl$h Pressure tank: nust be vented through the A. B. C A.B. C
 
Or eustvent 1.ie1m Orbiter or Ground Control is reqired.
 
3 	 Act si t,. 11pa~tad pyrotechnics from the PCR s required A. B. C
 
lI' for,,,., ldd-,r etc must be provided for accc s
 
I 	 Orinerl/a load ituid umbilicals ishould be designed to limit A. B. C
 
to4 .,, t do ..
onto.t
 
5 Orttl" otr, l opr t.tuchncs ft. .ing A. BC
andverification i. 

required
 
6 	 Oro sndurnBIl la for payloads hazardous fluids must B. C
 
pro-t o fill, drain.loth. and purge capability.
 
7 A I zarious g-; analyzer system is required for the B. C
 
p tast -,' It ir pad
 
''Pt-,oa,[ dehitn 	 fapability B. Cuild provide acres. or 

t -ld r I .... in the
 va|inhe vcrtical while 
fi Jstos loa.ardou. flrds dump capability through B C
 
Or1-r control is rcqutred Dimp should be through
 
10 GSF for grootodpotrge of payload cryogenic tank. is B C C C C
 
. 1rat ours.
the landing 
IL 	 A portat.le haradruus gasarnalyicr stillbe required to B. C C C C
 
monitor the payload bay atmosphere at the landing
 
stripand alternate site,.
 
12 	 A nigh flow rate ON purge system for the payload bmy B C B. C C
 
should be provided at the landing strip.
 
LEGEND: 
A - Spacelab/ATL/IRTCM
 
B - IUS/FZPU/PJP
 
C - Tug/SEPS/SEOS
 
These additional conclusions are not included in Table V because 
they apply to only one cargo. 
-Reproduced from ' 
best available copy. 
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* 	 If the backout or vertical changeout for the IUS cargo con­
tingency is initiated by the liquid fluorine oxidizer system, 
pad venting and safing of the fluorine system will first be 
required. The design of the pad vent system and fluorine 
oxidizer system should allow gas and liquid to be dumped. 
If the integrity of the fluorine oxidizer system is sound, 
dumping at the pad is not recommended. 
* 	 Unless present NASA studies related to inflight dumping 
indicate differently, fluorine vent/dump provisions should 
be .provided in the Orbiter that can also be used for controlled 
ground and flight dumping and venting. 
* 	 A mobile water cooling system is required at the landing strip 
to supplement the 15-hour supply of onboard RTG cooling 
since 24 hours are required to gain access to the cargo in 
the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF). 
* 	 Fluorine handling provisions are required in the OPF in case 
of an abort with the IUS cargo. If the fluorine has not been 
dumped in space, a portable LN2 cooling supply will be 
required to maintain the thermal/pressure balance until the 
FZPU can be removed. 
* 	 An alternate to removing the aborted IUS/FZPU/PJP in the 
OPF is safing at the landing strip or other facility. A portable 
fluorine disposal system and a heated GN Z servicer to aid in 
residual boiloff is required. A fluorine tank horizontal drain 
provision for draining residuals would reduce disposal time. 
3. 3. 	 2 Contingency GSE/Facility Identification 
Contingency GSE/facility requirements identified were: 
* 	 GSE 
- - Mercury Decontamination System 
-- Mobile Water Cooling System (RTG Cooling at Landing 
Strip) 
-- GN2 Purge System for Payload Bay (at Landing Strip) 
" 	 Facility 
-- Emergency Fluorine Vent/Dump Capability at SAEF #1 
-- Emergency Fluorine Vent/Dump Capability at the Pad 
13 
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3.4 CURRENT PAYLOADS SURVEY AND ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this analysis was to determine the safety require­
ments and criteria that should be applied to current payloads so that 
they can be flown on the Shuttle. The applicable STS safety criteria 
compiled and developed by this task give NASA a checklist to assist in 
evaluating how well the payload designer has eliminated or reduced the 
hazards to the STS induced by the hazardous materials and systems on 
their payloads. 
Three'classifications of safety criteria were established as 
follows: 
* Design Safety Criteria 
* General Payloads Criteria 
* Operational Safety Criteria 
The results of this analysis consists of listings of safety criteria 
that are applicable to given current payloads and are, by nature, not 
readily condensable. These listings are contained in Volume 5. 
3. 5 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT POTENTIAL REQUIREMENTS 
The purpose of this task was to identify those hazards that may 
influence the existing KSC Environmental Impact Statement and to 
recommend methods for reducing their effects. Those hazardous 
rmaterials that have been identified as having a possibly significant 
environmental impact over and above those already identified in KSC 
EIS's are fluorine and its reaction products, mercury and its reaction 
products, radioisotopes, and microorganisms. 
14
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4.0 SUMMARY OF STUDY RESULTS (BY CARGO) 
This study has defined a number of potentially hazardous payload 
systems and operations involved in the ground processing of selected 
cargoes on the Space Shuttle. The majority of these hazardous operations 
and systems has been safely dealt with in previous launch operations at 
KSC. Considered individually, most of these hazards, such as ,cryogenics, 
hypergolics, high pressure gases, explosives, need not present any more 
of a hazard to Shuttle ground operations than on previous mission opera­
tions. An important exception to this is the processing of fluorine. 
However, the frequency of these hazardous operations in the Shuttle 
Program may increase the probability of an accident or unplanned event 
and the location of multihazard payloads in the confinement of the Orbiter 
payload bay would have a synergistic effect ifan accident occurs. 
4. 1 IUS/F 2 PU/PJP CARGO 
Of the three cargoes analyzed, the IUS/FZPU/PJP cargo is the 
most difficult to process safely, primarily because of the fluorine. 
Operational, equipment/facilities and payloads safety criteria were 
developed to reduce the hazards associated with processing this cargo. 
However, it is felt that other configurations for a fluorinated oxidizer 
system should be evaluated in anticipation of further reducing the hazards 
associated with processing a propulsion unit with fluorine as its oxidizer. 
The potential hazards resulting from the use of a fluorine 
oxidizer propulsion unit on a Shuttle cargo are manyfold. The inherent 
reactivity of fluorine requires that elaborate precautions be taken to 
prevent an inadvertent spill or leakage of this material at any stage of 
the ground operations. These precautions must provide for the protection 
of operating personnel, the environment/ecology, and facilities and 
equipment. This will call for separate facilities and equipment for 
transfer, handling, storage, loading, and disposal of the fluorine. 
con­
tinual maintenance/service between periods of usage to maintain the 
facility in a condition that can safely handle F 2 . This is primarily due 
to the reactive and corrosive nature of fluorine, which necessitates that 
all lines, valves, tanks, etc. be maintained in a dry, inert condition, 
and that after use the system be completely purged to remove the F 2 to 
prevent severe corrosion of the valves, pipes, etc. If there are relatively 
long periods between use of the facility, it may be necessary to disassemble 
and inspect a large part of the F. loading system before each use. 
A dedicated fluorine loading facility will require almost 
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4.2 TUG/SEPS/SEOS CARGO 
The payload in the Tug/SEPS/SEOS cargo that requires special
consideration is the SEPS. The use of this mercury containing propulsion
unit in the Shuttle cargo may present some potentially hazardous situa­
tions during normal ground operations. A mercury leak while in the 
Orbiter bay could result in a mission scrub because the Orbiter and its 
installed payloads would require major refurbishment. This is primarily 
because of the dispersive nature of mercury. The high surface tension 
and low viscosity properties of mercury cause it to break into small 
droplets upon impact. These droplets, some smaller than the eye can 
see, can cause electrical shorts and corrosion. A leak prior to Orbiter 
bay closing could also contaminate the payload changeout room with 
similar effects. Additional hazards arise from the possibility of operating 
personnel breathing mercury vapors that result from a large spill or
 
leak, and the possibility of the mercury liquid getting into the adjacent

ground water and presenting an environmental/ecological problem. It is
 
felt that the use of the proper personnel protective equipment, 
 mercury
 
vapor detection and monitoring equipment, and prompt cleanup/decon­
tamination procedures on such spills or leaks will preclude the possibility
 
that such spills would have a significant effect on ground operations. 
Another potentially hazardous situation, resulting from the use 
of mercury containing stages, is the possibility of a fire and/or explosion 
occurring during an abort or similar situation that could conceivably 
release a large cloud of mercury vapor into the atmosphere. Studies of 
expected downwind distances under various wind/weather conditions, etc. 
would help to define the potential effects and provide the criteria/conditions 
under which such an accident could be prevented from developing into a 
major hazard to the local populace. 
4. 3 SPACELAB/ATL/IRTCM CARGO 
The handling, transfer and storage of microbiological/biological 
materials relative to the Spacelab cargo present operational problems 
but do not present a significant hazard potential. There will be a need 
for a Mobile Biological Laboratory to facilitate handling and storage of 
the containerized specimens to maintain them under controlled tempera­
ture and atmospheric conditions during ground operations at KSC. Also, 
trained and suitably equipped microbiological decontamination personnel 
should be available at all times during the ground operations involving 
these materials in the event that an accident should provide the possibility
of the release of these organisms into the environment. Other cargoes, 
not included in this task, that may use animals, or particularly virulent 
or pathogenic organisms, mnay require more elaborate facilities, for 
transfer, handling and holding during ground operations. 
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5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHUR STUDY 
The principal recommendations for further study effort are as 
follows: 
* 	 The reaction of fluorine with atmospheric moisture is 
unpredictable and sometimes violent. A study should be 
made to determine the conditions under which violent 
reactions would not occur and establish the atmospheric 
condition limits for processing fluorine containing space­
craft. 
* 	 A study should be performed to establish the maximum 
allowable concentrations of fluorine and hydrogen fluoride 
for the general public, since the limits now established are 
for exposure of personnel under controlled working condi­
tions. 
* A study should be made to evaluate the safety related pro­
cessing characteristics of different payload concepts con­
taining fluorine oxidizer systems to determine those con­
cepts that would optimize processing and flight safety. 
This study should also develop new design approaches that 
would minimize the safety problems associated with fluorine. 
* A study should be made to evaluate the impact on the 
environment of dumping fluorine in near space. In-flight 
dumping of fluorine could be required during an abort 
s ituation. 
* 	 A study should be made to evaluate the effects on the environ­
ment of dumping mercury in near space. In-flight dumping 
of mercury could be required during an abort situation. 
* 	 An accidential fire or explosion at KSC could result in the 
injection of large quantities of mercury vapor into the 
atmosphere. A study should be made to assess the effects 
on the environment of such an accidential release of 
mercury. 
* 	 A study should be conducted to identify the requirements for 
an all purpose carrier aircraft of the Boeing 747-type to 
transport special equipment to the alternate landing site and 
to ferry the Orbiter back to KSC. 
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* 	 A cargo bay access and payload interface study should be 
made to identify requirements to allow individual payload 
changeout.
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6.0 ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS 
Areas that require an advanced technology development are: 
" 	 Although some fluorine sensors are currently available, a 
satisfactory fluorine and hydrogen fluoride detector for low 
concentrations in the air does not exist. The development 
of a reliable fluorine sensor for use in both ground and flight 
operations is mandatory if fluorine fueled stages are to be 
safely processed and flown on the Shuttle. 
* 	 There is a requirement for the disposal of fluorine gas during 
loading operations and potentially for the disposal of relatively 
large quantities of fluorine during emergency situations. 
Although numerous methods for fluorine disposal have been 
studied none are completely suitable for KSC operations and 
it is recommended that a portable fluorine disposal system 
be developed. 
o 	 The various consequences of fluorine or other hazardous 
materials leakage requires that the integrity of tanks and 
plumbing systems be verified with a high degree of confidence. 
Thermal imaging systems could be used in a variety of 
.applications for determining temperature profiles, thermal 
insulation degradation, and cryogenic gas leakage. The 
application of such systems to launch site processing piob­
lems should be investigated. 
* 	 A program should be conducted to evaluate existing personnel 
protective systems and to develop new systems including 
protective and life support systems as required for complete 
protection from fluorine. The existing KSC "SCAPE" systems 
are not compatible with fluorine and its reaction products. 
* 	 Since relatively low levels of mercury can cause personal
 
injury and result in corrosive attack on various metals and
 
electronic components, and most mercury vapor detectors/
 
monitors are intended for field or laboratory use, the need
 
exists for the design/development of a multichannel flight
 
weight mercury monitoring system for use on the Space
 
Shuttle.
 
* 	 The development of a hazardous gas analyzer is recommended 
for pad operations and at the landing site to detect any hazard­
ous fluid/gas leakages. 
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